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EXPANDING THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE TO 
INCLUDE POST-TERMINATION MISCONDUCT 
HOLLY G. EUBANKS*
INTRODUCTION
When a former employee brings a lawsuit against his or her previous 
employer claiming discriminatory treatment or wrongful discharge, the 
employer will immediately start preparing its defense. Now, what happens 
if that employer discovers that the plaintiff had previously committed some 
offense or misconduct that would have led to termination had the employer 
known? Can the employer use this information as a part of its defense to 
the discrimination lawsuit? In 1995, the Supreme Court established the 
after-acquired evidence defense as applied to federal anti-discrimination 
employment statutes in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Compa-
ny.1 The defense generally requires an employer to establish that it would 
have fired the former employee because of the employee’s wrongdoing if 
the employer had known of the misconduct prior to termination.2 Thus, the 
employer needs to establish that the wrongdoing did in fact occur, that the 
employer was unaware of the wrongdoing prior to the decision to termi-
nate, and that the wrongdoing would have resulted in termination based on 
the employer’s actual employment practices.3 If the defendant establishes 
these elements, then the Supreme Court determined that in the typical case, 
the remedies of front pay and reinstatement should be unavailable and that 
the calculation of backpay should end on the date the wrongdoing was dis-
covered.4 In addition, the Supreme Court indicated that courts should also 
consider any “extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legiti-
mate interests of either party” when fashioning the plaintiff’s remedy.5
Since the Supreme Court’s formulation of the defense, lower federal 
courts have been forced to determine the boundaries of the defense as ap-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
 1.  See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
 2.  See Melissa Hart, Retaliatory Litigation Tactics: The Chilling Effects of “After-Acquired 
Evidence”, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 401, 414 (2008). 
 3.  See generally id. at 429-31. 
 4.  See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362. 
 5.  Id.
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plied to various situations and factually distinct cases. These courts have 
generally agreed that the defense applies to situations of resume and appli-
cation fraud, as well as on-the-job misconduct like that at issue in McKen-
non.6 However, federal courts have been unsure of how to handle other 
expansions of the defense, in particular, whether the defense is applicable 
to situations of post-termination misconduct. For example, does the defense 
apply when an employee steals confidential documents from his employer 
after his termination? Alternatively, does the defense apply when the em-
ployee engages in illegal conduct after termination that makes the employ-
ee unsuitable for reinstatement? Relatively few federal courts have 
evaluated the potential expansion of the after-acquired evidence defense, 
and those courts have taken various positions on the issue. 
The after-acquired evidence defense should include the plaintiff’s 
post-termination misconduct when the defendant establishes it would have 
fired the plaintiff for the misconduct because this type of conduct potential-
ly falls within the extraordinary equitable considerations that McKennon
instructed federal courts to consider when determining the appropriate 
damages. Post-termination misconduct should only affect the available 
remedies and not the employer’s liability for unlawful discrimination. 
However, the post-termination misconduct should not be attributable to the 
defendant’s discriminatory actions or wrongful termination because allow-
ing this sort of misconduct by the plaintiff to limit remedies would ignore 
the important purposes behind federal anti-discrimination employment 
laws. Thus, the McKennon Court’s framework of the after-acquired evi-
dence defense in limiting back pay and barring reinstatement or front pay 
should apply to the plaintiff’s wrongdoing that occurs after termination, 
just as it applies to on-the-job misconduct and resume or application fraud. 
This Note argues that the after-acquired evidence defense should ex-
pand to include a plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct when the miscon-
duct does not directly flow from the unlawful discrimination or retaliation. 
Part I will examine the legal environment prior to McKennon, in particular 
the circuit split concerning the after-acquired evidence defense’s effect on 
liability, as well as the Supreme Court’s resolution of the circuit split and 
its formulation of the defense in McKennon. It will also consider the gener-
ally accepted application of the defense to resume fraud as well as on the 
job misconduct. Part II will examine federal court opinions that have con-
sidered including post-termination misconduct in the after-acquired evi-
dence defense. The reasons of the federal courts for expanding or not 
 6.  See Hart, supra note 2, at 426-27. 
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expanding the defense will be discussed in detail. Finally, Part III will ar-
ticulate why the Supreme Court’s formulation of the after-acquired evi-
dence defense and the purpose of equitable remedies, particularly front pay, 
support the inclusion and consideration of post-termination misconduct that 
is not attributable to the discrimination claim and that makes the plaintiff 
ineligible for reinstatement. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT FORMULATED THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
DEFENSE IN MCKENNON.
A. Prior to McKennon, the Circuit Courts Were Split on the Effect of After-
Acquired Evidence on Liability. 
In the late 1980s, employers commonly used the after-acquired evi-
dence defense in employment discrimination litigation, and federal courts 
generally accepted the defense as a complete bar on liability and denied 
any recovery.7 The Tenth Circuit in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company articulated this view by determining that after-
acquired evidence of employee misconduct could not be ignored because 
even though the after-acquired evidence was not the cause of the employee 
discharge, it was relevant to the plaintiff’s claim of injury.8 Summers found 
after-acquired evidence cases to be similar to mixed-motive cases because 
both have a lawful and an unlawful justification for the termination.9 For 
mixed-motive cases, there is no remedy if the lawful motive for termination 
was sufficient to justify termination on its own.10 The Summers Court 
compared the situation of after-acquired evidence sufficient to lead to the 
employee’s termination to “the hypothetical wherein a company doctor is 
fired because of his age, race, religion, and sex and the company, in de-
fending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the discharged em-
ployee was not a ‘doctor.’”11 The Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiff, 
whose misconduct was discovered after termination, was in the same posi-
tion as the “masquerading doctor” and therefore was not entitled to any 
relief.12
 7.  Id. at 405-06. 
 8.  Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988) abrogated by 
McKennon, 513 U.S. 352. Here, the Defendant discovered that the Plaintiff had falsified many company 
records and that 18 of the falsifications had occurred after Plaintiff’s probation, in which he was warned 
that any future falsifications would result in discharge. Id. at 702-03. 
 9.  See id. at 705-07. 
 10.  Id. at 705. 
 11.  Id. at 708. 
 12.  Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Tenth Circuit’s approach to 
after-acquired evidence.13 The Eleventh Circuit found that the Summers
opinion ignored the lapse of time that occurred between the decision to 
terminate and the discovery of the after-acquired evidence that provided a 
legitimate motive for the decision.14 The time lapse makes after-acquired 
evidence distinct from mixed-motive cases, where both a legitimate and an 
illegitimate motive played a role in the decision to terminate employment.15
The Supreme Court had previously determined that the defendant would 
not be liable in a mixed-motive case if the defendant could establish that 
the same decision would have been made absent the illegitimate motive.16
However, the Eleventh Circuit did not find this logic applicable to after-
acquired evidence because in using the mixed-motive logic, the Summers
Court “excuses all liability based on what hypothetically would have oc-
curred absent the alleged discriminatory motive assuming the employer had 
knowledge that it would not acquire until sometime during the litigation 
arising from the discharge.”17 This view violates the principle of federal 
anti-discrimination laws that the “plaintiff should be left in no worse a po-
sition than if she had not been a member of a protected class or engaged in 
protected opposition to an unlawful employment practice.”18
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit determined that after-acquired evidence 
is relevant to the available relief and remedies, which should be determined 
on a case-by-case basis.19 Courts need to balance the employer’s right to 
make business decisions for lawful reasons with the need to make the 
plaintiff whole after discrimination.20 The plaintiff, in this case, lied on her 
employment application concerning a previous conviction for possession of 
cocaine and marijuana.21 Assuming this is sufficient misconduct for the 
defendant to discharge the plaintiff, then reinstatement and front pay are 
inappropriate remedies because they would infringe on the defendant’s 
right to lawfully discharge employees and would put the plaintiff in a better 
position beyond making her whole.22 However, the remedy of backpay 
should remain available unless the defendant can establish that it would 
 13.  Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d 
1489 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 14.  Id. at 1179. 
 15.  Id. at 1181. 
 16.  See id. at 1180. See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989).
 17.  Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179. 
 18.  Id.
 19.  Id. at 1181. 
 20.  Id.
 21.  Id. at 1176-77. 
 22.  Id. at 1182. 
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have discovered the after-acquired evidence prior to the end of the backpay 
period without the litigation.23
The Third Circuit also weighed in on the debate and took a similar 
stance to the Eleventh Circuit.24  The Third Circuit determined that after-
acquired evidence should have absolutely no bearing at the liability stage of 
employment discrimination claims because the legitimate reason for the 
adverse employment action did not motivate the employer in any way at 
the time of the decision.25 In addition, the victims of employment discrimi-
nation have clearly suffered real injury beyond that of the adverse employ-
ment action; they were unlawfully discriminated against.26 The Court artic-
articulated its disagreement with Summers by arguing that “to maintain that 
a victim of employment discrimination has suffered no injury is to depre-
cate the federal right transgressed and to heap insult (“You had it coming”) 
upon injury.”27 Federal courts need to provide a remedy for the violation of 
a federal right,28 especially in light of the public interest in punishing un-
lawful discrimination in order to deter future occurrences.29 However, af-
ter-acquired evidence of application fraud or employee misconduct on the 
job is relevant at the remedial stage of the litigation.30 Generally, courts 
should not cut off backpay prior to the date of judgment unless the employ-
er can demonstrate that it would have discovered the misconduct outside of 
the litigation.31 For other remedies, especially reinstatement, the Third 
Circuit emphasized the importance of considering the employer’s interest 
in making choices for legitimate business purposes because the federal 
laws against employment discrimination were not designed to unnecessari-
ly interfere with employer free choice.32
B. The Supreme Court Resolved the Circuit Split in McKennon and Defined 
the Parameters of the After-Acquired Evidence Defense. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement 
among the Circuit Courts on whether wrongful conduct that would have 
 23.  Id.
 24.  See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir.1994), vacated, 514 
U.S. 1034 (1995). 
 25.  Id. at 1228. 
 26.  Id. at 1232. 
 27.  Id.
 28.  Id.
 29.  See id. at 1234-35. 
 30.  Id. at 1238. 
 31.  Id. at 1239-40. 
 32.  Id. at 1240. 
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resulted in discharge, discovered after an employee has been discharged in 
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) bars all 
of the plaintiff’s relief.33 To evaluate the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, the Supreme Court had to assume that the defendant did indeed 
violate the ADEA and that the plaintiff’s misconduct was severe enough to 
result in termination.34 The Supreme Court determined that the after-
acquired evidence could not bar all relief because it could not completely 
disregard an ADEA violation.35 However, as the Eleventh and Third Cir-
cuits found, the employee’s wrongdoing was relevant at the remedial 
stage.36
The plaintiff in McKennon brought an action under the ADEA when 
she was terminated from employment at age sixty-two.37 The ADEA makes 
it unlawful for an employer to discharge or discriminate against an employ-
ee because of the employee’s old age.38 During the plaintiff’s deposition, 
she testified that prior to her termination she copied and brought home 
several confidential documents concerning her employer’s financial state.39
In response to the deposition, the defendant notified the plaintiff again that 
she was terminated based on her testimony regarding the removal and cop-
ying of company records and the defendant then used this information to 
bring a motion for summary judgment.40 The District Court granted the 
motion for summary judgment, finding that her misconduct was grounds 
for termination and barring all relief, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.41
The Supreme Court began by considering the purpose of the ADEA, 
finding that Congress enacted the ADEA as part of a broader effort to 
“eradicate discrimination in the workplace.”42 The remedial measures in 
the ADEA as well as other federal anti-discrimination employment statutes 
were designed to deter unlawful discrimination as well as compensate vic-
tims of unlawful discrimination for their injuries.43 These objectives, spe-
cifically deterrence, would not be served if after-acquired evidence of 
 33.  McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356 (1995). 
 34.  Id.
 35.  Id. at 356-57. Here, the Supreme Court effectively overruled Summers v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 36.  McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361. 
 37.  Id. at 354. 
 38.  Id. at 355. 
 39.  Id.
 40.  Id.
 41.  Id.
 42.  Id. at 357. This broader statutory purpose is also encompassed in other federal statutes enact-
ed to protect employees in the workplace such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Id.
 43.  Id. at 358. 
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employee wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination operated as 
a complete bar to relief for a violation under the Act.44
In addition, the Supreme Court determined that after-acquired evi-
dence cases are not like mixed-motive cases.45 In Mt. Healthy, the Supreme 
Court previously found that an employee could not recover in a suit against 
an employer who had both a lawful and unlawful reason for the termination 
when the lawful reason alone would have justified termination.46 Here, in 
an after-acquired evidence case, the misconduct was not known at the time 
of the termination, and the assumption is that the unlawful motive was the 
only reason for the termination.47 Thus, “[t]he employer could not have 
been motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that 
the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason.”48 The after-
acquired evidence, then, is not relevant to the defendant’s liability.49
However, after liability is established, the Supreme Court determined 
that the after-acquired evidence was relevant to the ultimate remedy.50
Courts must consider both the legitimate interests of the employer and the 
employee, and to advance the legitimate interests of the employer, the em-
ployee’s wrongdoing must be considered in the remedial stage.51 The 
ADEA prohibits discrimination; it is not intended to regulate the workplace 
generally or constrain employers from considering business priorities in 
their employment decisions.52 Courts should take “account of the lawful 
prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its business and the 
corresponding equities that it has arising from the employee’s wrongdo-
ing.”53 The Supreme Court was attempting to strike a balance between the 
civil rights of the employee and the business prerogatives of the employ-
er.54
The Supreme Court provided some general guidelines for courts in de-
termining the effect of after-acquired evidence on the available remedies. 
The proper boundaries of remedial relief in the general class of cases 
where, after termination, it is discovered that the employee has engaged 
 44.  Id.
 45.  Id. at 359. 
 46.  Id.
 47.  Id. at 359-60. 
 48.  Id. at 360. 
 49.  Id.
 50.  Id. at 360-61. 
 51.  Id. at 361 (“The employee’s wrongdoing must be taken into account, we conclude, lest the 
employer’s legitimate concerns be ignored.”). 
 52.  Id.
 53.  Id.
 54.  See Hart, supra note 2, at 411. 
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in wrongdoing must be addressed by the judicial system in the ordinary 
course of further decisions, for the factual permutations and the equitable 
considerations they raise will vary from case to case.55
The Supreme Court did indicate that generally, reinstatement and front 
pay would not be appropriate remedies because “[i]t would be both inequi-
table and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer 
would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful 
grounds.”56 As for the determination of a backpay award, “[o]nce an em-
ployer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate 
discharge,” the employer is not required “to ignore the information, even if 
it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer 
and even if the information might have gone undiscovered absent the 
suit.”57 Trial courts should calculate backpay “from the date of the unlaw-
ful discharge to the date the new information was discovered.”58 The Su-
preme Court emphasized that federal courts should consider “extraordinary 
equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either par-
ty.”59 Furthermore, in order to rely upon the after-acquired evidence of 
wrongdoing, an employer “must first establish that the wrongdoing was of 
such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on 
those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the dis-
charge.”60
C. The After-Acquired Evidence Defense in Practice as it Applies to On-
the-Job Misconduct and Resume Fraud. 
After McKennon, lower federal courts had to expand on the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the defense and apply the general guidelines to 
many different factual scenarios. First, federal courts had to determine what 
the employer had to establish to assert the defense. The defendant must 
establish that the employee’s alleged misconduct actually occurred.61 In 
addition, the Ninth Circuit articulated that an employer must demonstrate 
that it would have terminated the employee, not simply could have.62 This 
requires an inquiry into the standards articulated in the employee handbook 
 55.  McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361. It is important to note that the Supreme Court refers to “wrong-
doing.” This concept will be discussed later in the Note. See infra Part III.A. 
 56.  Id. at 361-62. 
 57.  Id. at 362. 
 58.  Id.
 59.  Id.
 60.  Id. at 362-363. 
 61.  See O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Nemeth v. Citizens Fin. Group, 08-CV-15326, 2012 WL 3262876, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2012). 
 62.  O’Day, 79 F.3d at 759. 
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concerning employee conduct and disciplinary proceedings, but it also 
requires an examination of the employer’s actual employment practices 
because “employers often say they will discharge employees for certain 
misconduct while in practice they do not.”63 Hence, the defendant must 
have been unaware of the misconduct prior to the decision to terminate 
because if the employer previously ignored the information, it would be 
incapable of establishing that it would have terminated the employee. The 
employer must prove this element by a preponderance of the evidence to 
assert the after-acquired evidence defense.64 This element becomes a ques-
tion of fact in many cases because it is difficult to determine if an employer 
would have fired the employee rather than could have fired the employee 
for the misconduct.65 Other federal courts have generally accepted the 
Ninth Circuit’s formulation of these requirements.66
Next, federal courts had to determine the point during litigation that 
the defendant could assert the defense. Federal courts have expressed di-
vergent views on exactly when the defendant must present the defense, in 
particular whether the defendant can amend its answer to include the de-
fense later in the litigation.67 The defense looks like an affirmative defense 
since it bars specific damages; however, a defendant must include an af-
firmative defense in its answer to be valid.68 A few courts have followed 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this respect and have refused to 
allow defendants to raise the defense at a later time.69 However, most fed-
eral courts have recognized the unusual nature of the defense in that it is 
typically not apparent until some discovery has been conducted.70 These 
courts generally permit the defendant to assert the defense at a later time, 
but the burden of proof is affirmatively placed on the defendant to establish 
the elements of the defense.71 The courts base their decision on a variety of 
factors including the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, how long it 
takes the defendant to assert the defense, and the availability of additional 
discovery for the plaintiff to respond to the alleged misconduct.72
 63.  Id.
 64.  Id. at 761. Initially, there was some debate on whether the standard should be the clear and 
convincing evidence standard. See Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Law of After-Acquired Evidence in 
Employment Discrimination Cases: Clarification of the Employer’s Burden, Remedial Guidance, and 
the Enigma of Post-Termination Misconduct, 65 UMKC L. REV. 159, 161-62 (1996).  
 65.  See Hart, supra note 2, at 419. 
 66.  See, e.g., Nemeth, 08-CV-15326, 2012 WL 3262876, at *4.  
 67.  Hart, supra note 2, at 419. 
 68.  Id. at 419-20. 
 69.  Id. at 420. 
 70.  Id.
 71.  Id.
 72.  Id. at 421. 
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In addition, federal courts have had to determine what type of miscon-
duct is included in the defense. McKennon clearly supports the proposition 
that the after-acquired evidence defense includes on-the-job misconduct, 
but federal courts have also accepted the proposition that it applies to re-
sume and application fraud as well.73 At first, federal courts struggled with 
whether to treat resume or application fraud differently from workplace 
misconduct, especially since the former are unlikely to ever be discovered 
absent discovery during litigation.74 Defendants also tried to argue that 
resume and application fraud should have a looser standard than on-the-job 
misconduct, in that the employer should only have to prove that it ‘would 
not have hired’ the plaintiff, not that it ‘would have fired’ the plaintiff.75
However, in general, federal courts have advocated the ‘would have fired’ 
standard and have elected to treat resume and application fraud according 
to the standards laid out in McKennon.76
Finally, the first federal courts to apply McKennon were also immedi-
ately confronted with the possibility of expanding the defense, and they 
were asked to determine whether a plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct 
that would have resulted in termination had the plaintiff still been em-
ployed could be used to limit damages.77 Their answers as well as more 
recent responses to the issue will be discussed in the following section. 
II. DOES THE MCKENNON FORMULATION OF THE DEFENSE ALLOW FOR THE 
INCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S POST-TERMINATION MISCONDUCT?
The federal courts that have considered expanding the after-acquired 
evidence defense to include post-termination misconduct can be sorted into 
three general categories based on their responses. First, courts that claim 
the plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct clearly falls outside of the scope 
of the employment relationship and should not be used at all to limit dam-
ages. Second, the courts that can imagine a situation in which they would 
consider post-termination misconduct when the elements of the defense 
have been met, but they are not willing to definitively rule on the issue. 
Finally, courts that have determined post-termination misconduct can be 
 73.  Id. at 416. 
 74.  Id.
 75.  Id. at 416 n.86. 
 76.  See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (3d. Cir. 1995); Wal-
lace v. Dunn Construction Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 374, 379 n.8 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 77.  See, e.g., Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Pa. 1995)(determining 
that the defense could not be used to limit damages when the misconduct occurred after termination); 
Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)(same); Carr v. Wood-
bury County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 905 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Iowa 1995)(same). 
2014] POST-TERMINATION MISCONDUCT 833 
considered in applying the after-acquired evidence defense. These opinions 
on the expansion of the defense will be examined in the following sections.
A. The After-Acquired Evidence Defense Presupposes an Employer-
Employee Relationship at the Time of the Misconduct. 
The first courts to consider including post-termination misconduct 
within the bounds of the after-acquired evidence defense refused to do so. 
They were heavily influenced by a federal district court opinion released 
prior to McKennon and that considered the issue in relation to the original 
Summers doctrine. The plaintiff, in Calhoun v. Ball Corporation, took 
more than 5,200 work documents after his termination without the permis-
sion of his employer, so the defendant employer asserted the after-acquired 
evidence defense in a motion for summary judgment.78 The Court deter-
mined that the Summers defense presupposed that the employee was em-
ployed at the time of the misconduct.79 However, this conclusion must be 
considered in light of the fact that the Summers Court concluded that after-
acquired evidence acted as a complete bar to liability. The District Court 
indicated that applying the Summers doctrine to post-termination miscon-
duct seemed “harsh” because it acted as an absolute defense.80 Thus, a 
discredited interpretation of the after-acquired evidence defense led to the 
conclusion that post-termination misconduct should not be considered. 
However, since McKennon’s interpretation of the defense did not bar all 
liability, the concerns expressed by the Calhoun Court are no longer as 
persuasive, and its conclusion should have been re-evaluated. 
Nevertheless, shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in McKen-
non, several other district courts took the same approach as Calhoun and 
found that the defense did not apply when the plaintiff’s alleged miscon-
duct occurred after her termination because “[t]he McKennon decision is 
premised on the employee’s misconduct occurring during her employ-
ment.”81 One District Court emphasized that the definition of after-
acquired evidence “presuppose[d] that there was an employer-employee 
relationship at the time the misconduct occurred, i.e., that the employee had 
not yet been terminated.”82 To the extent the plaintiff’s conduct occurred 
after termination, the Court would not limit the plaintiff’s available reme-
 78.  Calhoun v. Ball Corp., 866 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 79.  Id. at 476-477 (“Summers presupposes that the employee was employed by the employer at 
the time of the employee’s misconduct. Stated another way, the misconduct must have occurred before
termination.”). 
 80.  Id. at 477. 
 81.  Sigmon, 901 F. Supp. at 682. 
 82.  Ryder, 879 F. Supp. at 537. 
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dies, but the Court was willing to reopen discovery to determine if any of 
the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct occurred while the plaintiff was still em-
ployed by the defendant.83 In a subsequent District Court case, after the 
plaintiff was terminated, the defendant provided her with an office and a 
telephone to use for her job search.84 While in the office, she found her 
professional evaluations as well as those of other associates, and she made 
copies of them for her own records.85 Since the “defendant and plaintiff 
were not in an employer-employee relationship at the time of the alleged 
incident,” the Court determined that “any complaint defendant [had] 
against plaintiff for her post-employment conduct falls outside of the 
McKennon rule, and outside of Title VII.”86 The Calhoun Court had also 
made a similar observation by indicating that employers are not left without 
remedies for their former employee’s post-termination misconduct because 
they can turn to civil remedies or criminal sanctions depending on the con-
duct.87
In Carr v. Woodbury Juvenile Detention Center, another District 
Court not only found that McKennon was not applicable to “after after-
acquired evidence” but also indicated that it was erroneous to apply an 
employer’s policies to someone, here the plaintiff, who is no longer receiv-
ing the benefits of employment.88 It determined that a presupposed condi-
tion of McKennon is that the misconduct occurred prior to termination but 
the employer did not know about it.89 The implied condition of the after-
acquired evidence defense is similar to a mixed-motive case where a neces-
sary condition is that the lawful and unlawful motives both exist at the time 
of termination.90 After-acquired evidence simply provides a constructive 
motive for the termination, so it must be available at the time of termina-
tion.91 Equity requires some effect for the wrongdoing unknown to the 
employer that occurs during employment, but when the misconduct occurs 
only after employment, it “is even more distant from the employer’s deci-
 83.  Id. at 538. 
 84.  Sigmon, 901 F. Supp. at 674. 
 85.  Id.
 86.  Id. at 683. 
 87.  Calhoun v. Ball Corp., 866 F. Supp. 473, 477 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 88.  Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 905 F. Supp. 619, 627-29 (N.D. Iowa 
1995). 
 89.  Id. at 627. 
 90.  Id. at 628. 
 91.  Id.
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sion-making process, because the misconduct is not temporally related to 
the decision as well as unknown to the employer.”92
In Carr, the defendant discovered that after termination, the plaintiff 
had tested positive in a urine analysis for marijuana use.93 The defendant 
argued that this made the plaintiff unsuitable for employment, especially in 
light of its policy stating, “[a]ny employee found guilty of indulgence in a 
controlled substance without seeking treatment will be discharged.”94 The 
Court determined that the employer’s policies could not be imposed on a 
person after employment had terminated because “[i]t would be grossly 
inequitable to hold [her] to all of the burdens of [the employer’s] policies at 
a time when she is not receiving any of the benefits of County employ-
ment.”95 In addition, the Court found it especially relevant that the employ-
er suffered no detriment from the plaintiff’s marijuana use because it did 
not relate to her employment.96
Even though the employer was not negatively impacted by her post-
employment conduct, the Carr Court did not consider the impact her mari-
juana use would have on possible reinstatement.97 The plaintiff worked at a 
juvenile detention center, so her marijuana use, while not relevant to liabil-
ity for discrimination, may have been relevant to her ability or qualification 
to return to her job and to continue to work with youth.98 This logic is simi-
lar to that expressed in McKennon where the Supreme Court emphasized 
that reinstatement would be pointless if the employer has a nondiscrimina-
tory reason to terminate the plaintiff.99
More recently, in a failure to rehire case, the Fifth Circuit determined 
that the plaintiff’s conduct of taking her personnel file after leaving the 
Sherriff’s department could not be used to assert the after-acquired evi-
dence defense.100 The defendant did not know about her actions because 
the plaintiff’s conduct occurred after the defendant decided not to hire 
her.101 Thus, the defendant cannot establish “that any wrongdoing was of 
 92.  Id. This notion that post-termination misconduct is even more distant from the employer’s 
decision-making process may not be entirely accurate. It is possible that pre-hire or on-the-job miscon-
duct occurred at a time much more distant from the decision to terminate than misconduct that occurs 
shortly after termination. See O’Brien, supra note 64, at 173. 
 93.  Carr, 905 F. Supp. at 621. 
 94.  Id.
 95.  Id. at 629. 
 96.  Id. at 628-29. 
 97.  See O’Brien, supra note 64, at 168. 
 98.  Id.
 99.  Id.
 100.  Vaughn v. Sabine County, 104 F. App’x 980, 987-88 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 101.  Id. at 988. 
836 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:2 
such severity that the wrongdoing alone would have resulted in the [plain-
tiff’s] termination.”102 The Court did not find post-termination conduct to 
be relevant, as it could not be the basis for the defendant’s failure to rehire 
the plaintiff.103
B. The After-Acquired Evidence Defense Might Extend to Post-Termination 
Misconduct.
Some federal courts have been willing to consider permitting the use 
of post-termination misconduct to limit damages as long as the post-
termination misconduct did not arise as a result of the defendant’s discrim-
ination or wrongful termination. The Tenth Circuit in Medlock v. Ortho 
Biotech, Inc. was the first court to express this view and to indicate that 
post-termination conduct may limit relief in certain circumstances, even 
though in the circumstances of this case it did not.104 The Court focused on 
the McKennon language encouraging courts to consider the unique “factual 
permutations and the equitable considerations” of each case individually in 
determining whether to limit relief.105 The defendant in Medlock argued 
that the jury instructions at the district court were improper when they did 
not include the after-acquired evidence defense because the plaintiff’s con-
duct of touching and cursing at defendant’s counsel during his unemploy-
ment compensation benefits hearing that occurred post-termination would 
have led to his discharge.106 The Tenth Circuit determined that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to use the defendant’s jury 
instructions on the issue of damages.107 The post-termination misconduct 
occurred during a hearing that was concerned with the plaintiff’s wrongful 
termination.108 “In this case, as in most cases in which the alleged miscon-
duct arises as a direct result of retaliatory termination, the necessary bal-
ancing of the equities hardly mandates a McKennon-type instruction on the 
after-occurring evidence.”109 The Medlock Court was especially concerned 
with the possibility of “a defendant goading a former employee into losing 
 102.  Id.
 103.  Todd J. McNamara & Kristina James, Post Termination Conduct and the After-Acquired 
Evidence Rule: An Arrow on Target or an Empty Quiver?, TRIAL TALK, June-July 2005, at 29, 30, 
available at http://www.18thavelaw.com/news/2005-06-01-employment.pdf.
 104.  Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e do not foreclose 
the possibility that in appropriate circumstances the logic of McKennon may permit certain limitations 
on relief based on post-termination conduct.”). 
 105.  Id.
 106.  Id.
 107.  Id.
 108.  Id.
 109.  Id.
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her temper, only to claim later that certain forms of relief should be una-
vailable because it would have discharged the plaintiff based on her inabil-
ity to control her temper.”110 Thus, the Tenth Circuit articulated a 
limitation on the use of post-termination misconduct that considers the 
purposes behind federal anti-discrimination statutes such as deterring dis-
crimination in the workplace and providing retribution to those who are 
discriminated against. 
Following the reasoning in Medlock, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the defendant’s partial mo-
tion for summary judgment on the issue of damages.111 The defendant ar-
gued that the plaintiff was ineligible for reinstatement and also ineligible 
for front pay because she “was convicted of simple assault and making 
terroristic threats in an incident at [defendant’s] store.”112 After considering 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Sellers v. Mineta, discussed in the follow-
ing section, and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Medlock, the Court “[found] 
it premature to weigh the equities regarding front pay” because it deter-
mined that the concerns expressed in Medlock could be applicable here, as 
the incidents occurred at the defendant’s store.113 Thus, it is possible that 
the actions of the defendant contributed to the plaintiff’s conduct. 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit indicated that it was willing to consider 
employee misconduct that occurs after some sort of adverse action was 
taken by the employer, but as in Medlock, it should not apply to limit re-
covery when the “misconduct can be attributable to the defendant’s prior 
illegal action.”114 In this case, the plaintiff’s wrongful conduct in violating 
the defendant’s policies occurred while he was on medical leave and still 
an employee, so his conduct did not exactly occur after termination.115
However, the Court determined that the defendant’s actions caused the 
plaintiff’s misconduct because if the defendant had not wrongfully imposed 
medical restrictions, making the plaintiff unfit to work, then the plaintiff 
would not have been forced to seek employment without the defendant’s 
permission in violation of its policies.116
The District Court in Cohen v. Gulfstream Training Academy, Inc.
took a slightly different approach to the applicability of post-termination 
misconduct to the after-acquired evidence defense and was willing to con-
 110.  Id. at n.7.  
 111.  Smyth v. Wawa, Inc., No. 06-4474, 2008 WL 741036, at *18 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 112.  Id. at *16. 
 113.  Id. at *17-18. 
 114.  Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc., 438 F. App’x. 388, 407 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 115.  Id.
 116.  Id.
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sider it when it flows from pre-termination misconduct. The Court denied 
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the defendant’s assertion 
of the after-acquired evidence defense.117 The defendant claimed that it 
would have terminated the plaintiff if it had known he was setting up a 
competing business, and the plaintiff contended that McKennon did not 
govern because the evidence used to support the defense occurred post-
termination.118
Plaintiff distinguishes Crapp (police officer) and Sellers (Federal Avia-
tion Administration employee) as cases involving a plaintiff’s loss of 
government certifications required to perform the previous job. Howev-
er, what the Court finds significant in Crapp, Sellers and the present case 
is that the post-termination evidence directly flows from the conduct that 
occurred pre-termination. In Crapp and Sellers, the loss of a certification 
precluded the ability to perform the previous job. In the present case, the 
post-termination evidence of Cohen’s actions corroborate the pre-
termination evidence of beginning to set up a competing business.119
The Court decided not to exclude the post-termination evidence be-
cause it could be used to support the proposition that the plaintiff took cer-
tain actions to set up a competing business prior to termination.120
Therefore, the Cohen Court was unwilling to consider exclusively post-
termination misconduct, but it was willing to permit defendants to use it to 
develop misconduct that occurred during the employment relationship. 
Similarly, in a more recent case, the District Court for the Northern 
District of Indiana considered both post-termination misconduct and on-
the-job misconduct when it determined that the plaintiff’s violations of the 
employer’s policies made the after-acquired evidence defense applica-
ble.121 The plaintiff took proprietary documents after termination in viola-
tion of the defendant’s Information Safeguarding Policy.122 The plaintiff 
also failed to report a potential infraction in violation of the Anti-
Harassment Policy.123 For its decision, the Court considered both post-
termination misconduct and on-the-job misconduct, so it is not possible to 
determine definitively if the after-acquired evidence defense would still 
apply if the misconduct had only occurred post-termination. 
Other federal courts have been unwilling to hold that there are no cir-
cumstances in which post-termination misconduct could be used to limit 
 117.  Cohen v. Gulfstream Training Academy, Inc., No. 07-60331-CIV, 2008 WL 961472, at *3 
(S.D. Fla. 2008).  
 118.  Id. at *2. 
 119.  Id. at *3. For a discussion on both Crapp and Sellers, see infra Part II.C. 
 120.  Id. at *3. 
 121.  Treat v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 762, 777 (N.D. Ind. 2010). 
 122.  Id.
 123.  Id.
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damages.124 In Ellis v. Cygnus Enterprises, the plaintiff brought a motion 
to strike the defendant’s affirmative defense, which asserted that the 
“[p]laintiff’s post-termination misconduct consisting of threats and pur-
ported extortion rendered him unsuitable for employment.”125 The Court 
was unwilling to strike the defense.126 “Although this Court is not entirely 
convinced that [the plaintiff’s] post-termination activities can serve as the 
basis for limiting his equitable damages, the Court cannot affirmatively 
rule, given the lack of Second Circuit precedent, that there are no circum-
stances under which the defense could be successful.”127
C. The After-Acquired Evidence Defense Extends to Post-Termination Mis-
conduct. 
Some federal courts have found that the plaintiff’s post-termination 
misconduct can affect his available remedies and can be included in the 
after-acquired evidence defense. In Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, the 
Eleventh Circuit determined that a plaintiff’s loss of certification to be a 
police officer after his termination limited the availability of backpay and 
reinstatement.128 The plaintiff, a black police officer, brought suit under 
Title VII alleging that his termination was racially motivated, and he was 
awarded compensatory damages, backpay, and reinstatement.129 However, 
reinstatement was stayed, while the Florida Department of Law Enforce-
ment investigated the plaintiff’s certification to be a police officer.130 The 
investigation resulted in his decertification for conduct unbecoming an 
officer for two years, beginning with the date of his termination.131 The 
District Court determined that the principles of McKennon required the 
award of backpay and reinstatement to be vacated, and the Eleventh Circuit 
agreed.132 The plaintiff’s loss of certification made the defendant unable to 
employ him as a police officer, so it was proper to vacate the award of 
 124.  See Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., No. 06 CIV. 589 (GEL), 2007 WL 2254698, at 
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) opinion withdrawn in part on reconsideration, 525 F. Supp. 2d 364 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The Second Circuit has never had occasion to decide whether post-employment 
misconduct can support an after-acquired evidence defense . . . . It is unnecessary to rule on this legal 
issue to decide defendants’ motion.”). 
 125.  Ellis v. Cygnus Enterprises, LLC, No. CV 11-771 (SJF) (AKT), 2012 WL 259913, at *2-3 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 126.  Id. at *5. 
 127.  Id. at *3. 
 128.  Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1021 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 129.  Id. at 1018-19. 
 130.  Id. at 1019. 
 131.  Id. at 1019 n.5. 
 132.  See id. at 1019-21. 
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backpay and reinstatement.133 However, the jury determined that the de-
fendant’s decision to fire the plaintiff was racially motivated, so the award 
of compensatory damages was appropriate in order to compensate him for 
the discrimination and to deter the defendant from future acts of discrimi-
nation.134
The Eighth Circuit in Sellers v. Mineta held that a plaintiff’s post-
termination conduct was relevant to the availability of front pay when a 
plaintiff’s post-termination conduct made her ineligible for reinstate-
ment.135 The Court found that the previous district courts that considered 
including post-termination misconduct in the after-acquired evidence de-
fense had read McKennon too narrowly, especially in regards to the 
McKennon instructions indicating that courts need to evaluate the equitable 
considerations of each case individually.136 There are clearly circumstances 
in which post-termination misconduct would be relevant to limiting re-
lief.137 For example, if after termination a plaintiff was convicted of a 
crime unrelated to the former position with the defendant and was then 
incarcerated because of it, this would make reinstatement impossible.138
The Eighth Circuit found that “[s]imple common sense tells us that it 
would be inequitable to award [the plaintiff] front pay in lieu of reinstate-
ment where she had rendered herself actually unable to be reinstated.”139
This is especially obvious in light of the nature of front pay as a disfavored 
remedy that should only be awarded in place of reinstatement when “rein-
statement is impractical or impossible due to circumstances not attributable 
to the plaintiff.”140 Furthermore, federal courts have concluded that a front 
pay award is precluded when the plaintiff unreasonably rejects an offer of 
reinstatement, so similarly, “post-termination misconduct of a type that 
renders an employee actually unable to be reinstated or ineligible for rein-
statement should also be one of the ‘factual permutations’ which is relevant 
in determining whether a front pay award is appropriate.”141
 133.  Id. at 1021. 
 134.  Id.
 135.  Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 136.  Id. at 1063. 
 137.  Id.
 138.  Id.
 139.  Id.
 140.  Id. at 1063-64. “It would be inequitable for a plaintiff to avail herself of the disfavored and 
exceptional remedy of front pay where her own misconduct precludes her from availing herself of the 
favored and more traditional remedy of reinstatement.” Id. at 1064. 
 141.  Id. at 1064. Here, the Sellers Court is referencing the language found in the McKennon deci-
sion.
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In Sellers, the plaintiff brought an action based on Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 when she was terminated from her position as an 
Air Traffic Control Specialist.142 During the litigation, she was employed at 
Bank of America, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict in her favor.143
However, after the trial, the plaintiff was terminated from Bank of America 
for attempting to process an unauthorized loan application for her spouse’s 
former wife.144 The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s conduct after ter-
mination was relevant to the availability of reinstatement or front pay as a 
remedy because it made her unsuitable for reinstatement as an air traffic 
controller.145 Based on the Court’s decision to consider post-termination 
misconduct as one of the relevant equitable considerations for determining 
the appropriate remedy, the Sellers Court remanded the case for a determi-
nation of whether the plaintiffs’ post-termination conduct “render[ed] her 
ineligible for reinstatement under the [defendant’s] employment regula-
tions, policies, and actual employment practices.”146 The Court emphasized 
that “[f]ront pay is an alternative remedy to reinstatement and should be 
unavailable where the plaintiff’s own conduct prevented reinstatement.”147
Relying on Medlock and Sellers, the District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma determined that the plaintiff’s post-termination mis-
conduct could not be presented to a jury but courts should consider it when 
determining the equitable remedy of front pay.148 The plaintiffs brought a 
motion in limine in order to ask the Court to exclude facts concerning an 
alcohol-related arrest and misdemeanor charge that occurred after termina-
tion.149 The Court found that the incident was not relevant for jury purpos-
es because courts decide the availability of equitable remedies such as front 
pay.150 However, after the jury returned a verdict, the Court would consider 
the evidence in deciding whether to award front pay.151 The plaintiff’s 
arrest and subsequent incarceration might have made him unfit for em-
ployment if he had not been previously terminated.152 The Court explained 
that the circumstances of the case were distinguishable from the circum-
 142.  Id. at 1059. 
 143.  Id. at 1060. 
 144.  Id.
 145.  Id.
 146.  Id. at 1065. 
 147.  Id.
 148.  Lunsford v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of Rogers, No. 05-CV-0218CVE-FHM, 2006 
WL 2679578, at *8 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 18, 2006). 
 149.  Id.
 150.  Id.
 151.  Id.
 152.  Id.
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stances in Medlock and the concerns expressed by the Tenth Circuit be-
cause the plaintiff’s misconduct was independent of the alleged retaliatory 
termination.153
In McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found the reasoning in Sellers to be 
persuasive and was willing to consider post-termination conduct that made 
the plaintiff ineligible for rehire or would justify termination, unless the 
conduct was attributable to the defendant.154 The plaintiff after his termina-
tion from the police department was arrested for possession of marijuana 
and subsequently convicted of knowingly possessing marijuana.155 The 
defendant asserted that the police department did not tolerate any drug use, 
including marijuana use, by its officers and that if the plaintiff had still 
been employed at the time of his conviction, he would have ultimately been 
terminated.156 Based on this assertion, the defendant argued that the after-
acquired evidence defense was applicable to cut-off backpay and front pay 
as to the date the defendant learned of the conviction.157
The District Court found this evidence relevant to determining the 
plaintiff’s equitable remedies because the broad language in McKennon
supported including post-termination conduct within the defense.158
Where a plaintiff has engaged in conduct after leaving the defendant’s 
employ that would justify refusing to re-hire him, or justify terminating 
him if he had remained employed at the defendant, then that fact should 
be taken into account in calculating equitable damages in order to take 
“due account of the lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual 
course of its business and the corresponding equities that it has arising 
from the employee’s wrongdoing.”159
In addition, the District Court found that the defendant had established 
that the plaintiff’s misconduct was severe enough to justify termination, as 
required by McKennon.160 However, it was necessary to determine if there 
was a causal relationship between the unlawful discrimination and the 
plaintiff’s conduct because “a plaintiff’s post-termination wrongdoing must 
not be attributable to the defendant’s conduct.”161 Here, the McKenna
Court found it inequitable to cut off the plaintiff’s backpay because there 
 153.  Id.
 154.  McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 636 F. Supp. 2d 446, 461 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  
 155.  Id. at 454. 
 156.  Id.
 157.  Id. at 459. 
 158.  Id. at 461. 
 159.  Id. (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995)). 
 160.  Id. at 461-62. 
 161.  Id. at 462. The Court applied the limitation expressed in Medlock. Id.
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were sufficient facts, such as the plaintiff’s inability to treat his depression 
without medical insurance, to find that the plaintiff’s marijuana use was 
causally related to the discrimination.162 “Although the Court has found 
that after-acquired evidence of a plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct 
can cut off an award of back pay in appropriate circumstances, it should 
only do so where that misconduct is independent of the defendant’s wrong-
doing.”163
III. THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE SHOULD EXPAND TO 
INCLUDE POST-TERMINATION MISCONDUCT BY THE PLAINTIFF IN CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES.
A. McKennon Does Not Require the Misconduct to Occur During the Em-
ployment Relationship. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in McKennon does not require a plain-
tiff’s misconduct to occur during the employment relationship. The Su-
preme Court referred to employee “wrongdoing,” not employee on the job 
misconduct.164 It also directed lower federal courts to consider the “factual 
permutations and equitable considerations” of each case.165 The Third Cir-
cuit emphasized this when it stated, “[T]he Supreme Court did not limit the 
general principles articulated in McKennon to cases involving on-the-job 
misconduct, instead using the broader term ‘wrongdoing’ as well as listing 
both types of after-acquired evidence cases (resume fraud and cases of on-
the-job misconduct).”166 This terminology is one reason federal courts 
decided to apply the defense to resume and application fraud, with little 
hesitation after McKennon.167 In fact, in any situation of plaintiff miscon-
duct, pre-hire, on-the-job, or post-termination, the defendant was entirely 
unaware of the wrongdoing when it made its decision to discriminate 
against or terminate the plaintiff. Thus, in the context of the defense, there 
is little reason to distinguish between wrongdoing that occurs before termi-
nation or after termination because in every case it is always discovered 
after the defendant’s unlawful act. 
Some scholars have even indicated that pre-hire misconduct such as 
resume fraud is logically similar to post-termination misconduct because 
the plaintiff’s misconduct occurred when there was not an established em-
 162.  Id. at 463. 
 163.  Id. at 464. 
 164.  See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361. 
 165.  Id.
 166.  Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 1074 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 167.  Hart, supra note 2, at 416. 
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ployment relationship, though no federal courts have yet reiterated this 
view.168 Any arguments suggesting that the post-termination misconduct is 
too distant from the defendant’s decision-making process to be included in 
the after-acquired evidence doctrine have to be considered in light of the 
recognition that instances of pre-hire misconduct (or even on-the-job mis-
conduct) might actually occur at a much more distant time from the de-
fendant’s decision.169 Post-termination misconduct to be asserted as a 
defense in a lawsuit must occur at some time between termination and the 
end of the litigation, but an instance of resume fraud could potentially oc-
cur years before the defendant’s discriminatory termination. However, it 
can be argued that instances of resume or application fraud may have influ-
enced the employer’s decision to hire that particular plaintiff, effectively 
starting the employment relationship, while post-termination misconduct 
clearly falls outside of the employment relationship. 
In addition, the McKennon Court supported a balancing of the lawful 
prerogatives of the defendant in running its business with the purposes of 
federal anti-discrimination employment statutes, mainly deterrence and the 
remedial interests in making the plaintiff, who was wrongly discriminated 
against, whole.170 The balance between these two competing interests does 
not indicate that post-termination misconduct should be treated differently 
than on-the-job or pre-hire misconduct. The defendant employer has a le-
gitimate and lawful interest in not reinstating someone whose conduct has 
made him or her ineligible for reinstatement or whose conduct would have 
resulted in a lawful termination. As the Sellers Court expressed, front pay 
should not be available when the plaintiff’s own wrongdoing made rein-
statement impossible.171 Furthermore, the McKennon articulation of the 
defense did not impact other types of damages, such as compensatory dam-
ages for the emotional distress or even punitive damages if the defendant’s 
actions were reprehensible, that are available to the plaintiff depending on 
the particular federal statute. These damages can provide retribution for the 
plaintiff and can work to deter future discrimination by employers. 
B. The Purposes of Front Pay and Other Equitable Remedies Support the 
Consideration of Post-Termination Misconduct in the Remedial Stage. 
The plaintiff’s wrongdoing does not justify the unlawful actions of the 
defendant, but equity requires the wrongdoing to be considered. As empha-
 168.  See O’Brien, supra note 64, at 168. 
 169.  Id. at 173. This is a response to the argument in Carr.
 170.  McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-61 (1995). 
 171.  Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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sized by the Supreme Court, the employer’s legitimate interests need to be 
taken into account when deciding whether equitable remedies are available 
to the plaintiff.172 Equitable remedies are used to make the plaintiff 
whole,173 or “to restore the employee to the position he or she would have 
been in absent the discrimination.”174 In the context of employment dis-
crimination, the available equitable remedies are backpay, front pay, and 
reinstatement.175 Equitable remedies are not intended to place the plaintiff 
in a better position than she would have been absent the discrimination. 
For instance, backpay is intended to compensate a plaintiff for the 
wages she would have received but for the discriminatory actions of the 
defendant, and it is typically calculated from the date of termination 
through the rendering of the verdict.176 However, in McKennon, the Su-
preme Court determined that successful application of the after-acquired 
evidence defense required backpay to be cut off earlier, at the date the de-
fendant discovered the misconduct.177 If an award of backpay was not cut 
off at that time, then possibly the plaintiff would be in a better place than 
she would have been absent the discrimination because, as required by the 
defense, she would have been fired for the wrongdoing. Arguably, this 
same result could occur even when a plaintiff’s wrongdoing occurred post-
termination such as in the case of the incarcerated plaintiff. 
Similarly, an award of front pay or reinstatement “would be inappro-
priate where it would ‘catapult the plaintiff into a better position than [he] 
would have enjoyed in the absence of discrimination.’”178 Front pay is only 
awarded in lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement is impractical or im-
possible for reasons not attributable to the plaintiff.179 Generally, rein-
statement is not awarded when there is workplace hostility from the 
discrimination litigation.180 However, as the Sellers Court articulated, when 
the plaintiff, through her own actions, becomes ineligible for reinstatement, 
it would be inequitable to award front pay instead.181 For example, a plain-
tiff that loses a required certification for her job, even when the loss occurs 
 172.  See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361. 
 173.  See Valerie Harris, Front Pay and Sexual Harassment Cases: What It Is, Why It Is Important 
and How to Make It Better, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 217, 225 (2000). 
 174.  McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362. 
 175.  See Harris, supra note 173, at 226-27. 
 176.  Id. at 226. 
 177.  McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362. 
 178.  McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 636 F.Supp.2d 446, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Donlin v. 
Philips Lighting N Am. Corp., 564 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 179.  See Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 180.  See Harris, supra note 173 at 225. 
 181.  Sellers, 358 F.3d at 1064. 
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after termination, should not be awarded front pay because her own actions 
made her ineligible for reinstatement to her former position. It would be 
inequitable in this situation to ignore the plaintiff’s wrongdoing, especially 
in light of the legitimate business considerations of the defendant. Thus, in 
some circumstances, post-termination misconduct must be considered in 
order to promote the goal of restoring the plaintiff without putting the 
plaintiff in a better position than she would have been absent the discrimi-
nation. 
C. The McKennon Principles Should Apply to a Plaintiff’s Post-
Termination Misconduct Unrelated to the Employer’s Discrimination. 
The plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct should be included in the 
after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon, just as on-the-
job misconduct and resume fraud are included. The defendant must estab-
lish that if the plaintiff had still been employed it would have terminated 
the plaintiff, based on the defendant’s actual employment practices. In ad-
dition, since this requires hypothetical analysis, it may be necessary to con-
sider if the post-termination misconduct makes the plaintiff ineligible for 
reinstatement. The Sellers Court stated the most obvious example, when it 
described a plaintiff who is convicted of a crime and then incarcerated.182
In this situation, the plaintiff clearly could not be reinstated, and most em-
ployers would terminate an employee who was incarcerated. However, 
some post-termination misconduct will be much less clear on whether or 
not the defendant would fire the plaintiff for the conduct if he had still been 
employed. 
Courts will have to consider the unique factual permutations of each 
individual case in relation to the post-termination misconduct, just as in-
structed by the McKennon decision. Federal courts, in determining whether 
the plaintiff’s misconduct would have resulted in termination if the plaintiff 
had still been employed, can consider the nature of the defendant’s busi-
ness and the seriousness of the plaintiff’s misconduct in relation to that 
business. For example, if the plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct con-
cerns stealing the employer’s confidential documents, the seriousness of 
this misconduct may be different depending on the defendant’s policies and 
the nature of the defendant’s business. In addition, courts should also con-
sider whether the misconduct affects the plaintiff’s ability or qualifications 
to perform her prior job.183 The plaintiff’s inability to perform her prior job 
 182.  Id. at 1063. 
 183.  See O’Brien, supra note 64, at 168. 
2014] POST-TERMINATION MISCONDUCT 847 
will make reinstatement impossible, which, as already indicated, should 
prevent the award of front pay. Courts should also determine whether the 
plaintiff’s misconduct was particularly egregious or criminal in nature, 
which generally supports a decision by the employer to terminate for the 
conduct, as the misconduct is more severe.184
Finally, not all post-termination misconduct by the plaintiff should be 
considered when limiting damages through the after-acquired evidence 
defense. The post-termination misconduct should not be attributable to the 
defendant’s wrongful and discriminatory actions because this would go 
against the purposes of anti-discrimination employment statutes. Defend-
ants should not benefit when their discriminatory actions lead to or cause 
the plaintiff’s misconduct. Courts must decide whether the unlawful dis-
crimination was the cause of the plaintiff’s misconduct. 
The concern expressed by the Tenth Circuit in Medlock is a perfect 
example of post-termination misconduct that should not be used to limit 
damages through the after-acquired evidence defense. The Court described 
a situation where the defendant goads the former employee into losing her 
temper or threatening the defendant and then the defendant attempts to use 
her behavior to limit damages “based on her inability to control her tem-
per.”185 In this situation, the defendant not only initiated the plaintiff’s 
reaction, but because of the defendant’s discrimination and the emotional 
distress associated with it, the plaintiff may be more susceptible to the de-
fendant’s provocation. Thus, when the plaintiff’s wrongdoing occurs after 
termination, it must be independent from the discrimination the plaintiff 
suffered and not attributable to the defendant’s unlawful actions. 
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in McKennon articulated the after-
acquired evidence defense as applied to federal employment discrimination 
cases, and it, as well as the purposes behind the defense and the purposes in 
awarding equitable remedies, supports the premise that post-termination 
misconduct by the plaintiff should be included within the defense. McKen-
non emphasized that the plaintiff’s wrongdoing should be considered when 
determining the appropriate remedies after liability is established. This 
focus on wrongdoing supports the inclusion of post-termination wrongdo-
ing, as well as on-the-job or pre-hire wrongdoing, by the plaintiff. In addi-
tion, equitable remedies, especially front pay, are intended to place the 
 184.  See id. at 172. 
 185.  Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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plaintiff in the position he would have been absent the discrimination. If 
post-termination misconduct is not considered, then in some circumstances, 
a plaintiff may end up in a position better than he would have been in ab-
sent the discrimination. Equitable remedies are not intended to provide the 
plaintiff with a windfall. However, post-termination wrongdoing that is 
attributable to the defendant’s discrimination should not be used to limit 
damages because defendants should not benefit from their discriminatory 
conduct. Federal courts have to consider the unique factual circumstances 
of each case when fashioning the appropriate remedies for the plaintiff, and 
hence, in some cases, this will require the court to consider post-
termination wrongdoing when applying the after-acquired evidence de-
fense. 
